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NOTES
LETTER OF CREDIT: GOLD BULLION?*
Introduction
Letters of credit' are a type of commercial paper traditionally used
to provide prompt payment for goods shipped long distances. Increas-
ingly, the letter of credit is being used as a security device in commercial
transactions rather than as a primary source of payment. This latter
type of credit, known as a standby or guaranty letter of credit, is
payable upon the customer's default on a financial or other obligation. 2
The commercial utility of the letter of credit is twofold: first, the
credit of a bank is substituted for the customer's credit and second,
the letter of credit creates an obligation to pay that is independent of
any contractual defenses the customer may have in the primary or
"underlying" transaction. The second of these features, the so-called
"independence principle," allows the seller to obtain payment even if
he has breached his contractual obligations so seriously that no payment
should be due under the primary contract. Payment is enjoined only
when the beneficiary fails to produce the required documents or where
one or more of these documents is not genuine. Whether a beneficiary
should be paid merely on presentation of documents, even where he
has committed actual fraud in the underlying transaction, is the subject
of this comment.
A recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision provides a good example
of the competing equities between the independence principle and the
commercial expectation of honesty. The supreme court in Cromwell v.
Commerce & Energy Bank announced the circumstances under which
payment of a letter of credit could be enjoined pursuant to Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:5-114(2)(b). 4 The court, interpreting that statute for
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* The writer was previously employed by the firm of Durio, McGoffin, Andrus &
Stagg, attorneys for the plaintiffs in Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank, 464 So. 2d
721 (La. 1985).
1. "Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other
person made at the request of a customer and of a kind within the scope of
this Chapter that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment
upon compliance with the conditions specified in the credit.
La. Commercial Laws: La. R.S. 10:5-103(a) (1983) [hereinafter cited as La. Com. Laws].
2. See generally J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code 709 (2d ed. 1980).
3. 464 So. 2d 721 (La. 1985).
4. Unless otherwise agreed, when documents appear on their face to comply
with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform
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the first time in Louisiana, held that, where the seller and beneficiary
were guilty of fraud in the underlying transaction this fraud would
justify an injunction of a standby letter of credit.' This res nova decision
is important at both the state and national levels. Cromwell will set the
standard for interpreting letter of credit transactions in Louisiana, and
since Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:5-114 is identical to the Uniform
Commercial Code Section 5-114, the case will provide recent authority
on an infrequently interpreted portion of the latter statute. Two aspects
of the Cromwell opinion will be examined in this comment: first, under
what circumstances payment of the letter of credit should be enjoined
due to fraud in the underlying transaction and second, whether an
assignee of the beneficiary should be subject to the defense of fraud in
the underlying transaction. Before analyzing the issues which were con-
sidered by the Louisiana courts, some background information on the
mechanics of letters of credit will be helpful.
The Mechanics of a Letter of Credit Transaction
Basically, a traditional or documentary letter of credit transaction
encompasses three separate transactions. In the first, or underlying trans-
action, between a buyer and seller, the seller provides merchandise for
a given price. The second transaction is between the buyer and the
issuer of the letter, typically a bank or other lending institution, in
which the bank issues a letter of credit to the seller-beneficiary in
exchange for the buyer's payment of a fee. 6 Finally, the letter of credit
itself creates a relationship between the issuer and the beneficiary. 7
to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title [Section
7-507] or of a security [Section 8-3061 or is forged or fraudulent or there is
fraud in the transaction
(a) The issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is
demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder if the draft or demand which
would make it a holder in due course [Section 3-302] and in an appropriate
case would make it a person to whom a document of title had been duly
negotiated [Section 7-502 or a bona fide purchaser of a security [Section 8-
302]; and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith
may honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the
customer of fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face of the
document, but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor.
La. Com. Laws § 10:5-114(2).
5. 464 So. 2d at 734. For a more detailed explanation of the supreme court's
characterization of the transaction see infra text accompanying notes 42-44.
6. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 704-15.
7. Id.; B. Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards 8-6 (1981);
but see Baker v. National Blvd. Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (issuer-
beneficiary relationship characterized as an "agreement").
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However, once the letter of credit is established, the issuer becomes
statutorily obligated to pay drafts drawn under the letter of credit upon
the beneficiary's presentation of the required documents., Merchants
developed the letter of credit to provide a prompt and certain method
of payment for goods shipped in international trade. 9 The documentary
letter of credit was developed as an alternative to the documentary sale. 0
A typical documentary letter-of-credit transaction might involve the
following events: United States customer A desires to purchase a ship-
ment of wine from French seller B. B, desiring prompt payment and
unsure of A's creditworthiness, requires A either to pay cash in advance
of shipment or to establish a letter of credit. A, not willing to pay for
the wine until he knows it has been shipped, opts for payment by a
letter of credit. A goes to his bank and asks it to issue a letter of
credit for B's benefit, to be paid upon presentation of a bill of lading.
A bill of lading can only be obtained by delivery of the wine to a
shipper and consigning it as the seller requires. Upon shipment of the
wine, B or a collecting bank presents a draft" drawn under the letter
of credit and the bill of lading to the issuing bank for payment. The
issuing bank pays B and subsequently collects the amount paid from
A.
12
Such a transaction has a high degree of commercial utility, stemming
from the fact that the bank rather than the buyer is primarily liable to
the seller. Substitution of a bank as the primary debtor decreases the
risk of nonpayment due to insolvency. Furthermore, the relationship
between the bank and the seller is generally independent of the underlying
contract between the buyer and seller. The independence of the credit
reduces the risk of nonpayment due to the buyer's asserting defenses
to payment such as breach of warranty. 3 From the buyer's perspective,
however, the independence of the letter of credit creates a risk that the
issuer may honor a draft when the beneficiary has fraudulently failed
to perform his obligations. A carefully drafted letter of credit provides
8. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 711.
9. Harfield, Code Treatment of Letters of Credit, 48 Cornell L.Q. 92, 93 (1962).
10. In a documentary sale, the buyer and seller agree that payment will be made
upon the seller's presentation of certain documents, usually a bill of lading and a sight
draft. After the goods are shipped, the seller or his agent will present the documents to
the buyer, who is obligated to make immediate payment. Risk of the buyer's insolvency,
dishonesty, or nonpayment due to a bona fide dispute are inherent is such a transaction.
See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 705-06.
11. A draft is a written order to pay a sum certain in money, payable on demand
or at a definite time and payable to order or bearer. Uniform Commercial Code 3-104;
La. Com. Laws § 10:3-104.
12. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 704-08.
13. Id. at 706-07.
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substantial protection to the buyer. He can require invoices, bills of
lading, or inspection certificates to insure that the beneficiary has in
fact complied with his obligations.
The standby letter of credit operates in the same basic framework
as the documentary credit. 14 The main difference is that the standby
letter of credit is used not as the expected means of payment, but rather
to secure payment. This is reflected in the type of documentation gen-
erally required by the standby letter of credit. In a documentary credit,
the key documents are usually a bill of lading and an invoice. In a
standby letter the key document is a "certificate of default," often
simply a statement that the beneficiary is alleging a default and demands
payment under the letter. 5
In both the documentary and standby letters of credit, the relationship
between the issuer and the seller-beneficiary is independent of the un-
derlying transaction. However, in the standby transaction, where simple
demand is the only document required for payment, the documents do
not protect the customer as they do in the typical documentary trans-
action. 6 Therefore, the protection against fraudulent documents does
little for the standby customer who is not really looking to the documents
for protection. 7 Thus, the question of whether the courts will enjoin
payment only for documentary fraud or also for fraud in the underlying
contract becomes critical for che standby customer.
Section 5-114 of the Uniform Commercial Code codifies the rule
of an early pre-code case'" that allowed courts to enjoin payment of a
letter of credit when fraud occurred in the underlying transaction.' 9
However, in order to preserve the commercial vitality of the letter of
credit, the exceptions to the independence principle generally have been
narrowly construed. 2 Reconciling these two competing principles-pre-
14. See B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-5. U.C.C. Article 5 does not distinguish between
documentary and standby letters of credit and has been interpreted as applying equally
to both types of credits. See, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Southern Nat'l.
Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1978).
15. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 713-14; B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-
5.
16. Comment, "Fraud in the Transaction": Enjoining Letters of Credit During the
Iranian Revolution, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 992, 1011-12 (1980).
17. See id. at 1012. The documents in a standby letter reflect the beneficiary's
perception of the customer's default. See id. at 1012 n.92. Documentary fraud in such
a situation would probably be extremely difficult to prove.
18. Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
19. United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 254, 259, 360
N.E.2d 943, 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1976); Comment, supra note 16, at 1002.
20. J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 735. For an example of strict application
of § 5-114, see Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 336 A.2d
316 (1975); but see Comment, supra note 16, at 1003-04.
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serving the commercial utility of the letter of credit and discouraging
fraud-is not an easy task. On one hand, the inclination is to require
the issuer to pay under the credit, despite the allegations of fraud, so
that commerce will not be disrupted. 21 Conversely, a "clean hands"
analysis would prevent a dishonest beneficiary from profiting at the
expense of an innocent buyer. 22
This writer feels that the standby customer should be protected from
fraud in the underlying transaction even at the expense of some of the
certainty of payment that gives the letter of credit its utility. The narrow
interpretation of the exceptions to the independence principle has resulted
in letters of credit being treated more as currency or gold bullion-
having intrinsic value-rather than as a commercial instrument, subject
to certain statutorily created defenses. Such treatment is not desirable
from a policy standpoint. The letter of credit that is based on fraud
should not be a viable commerical instrument. Even if treating letters
of credit as "currency" was theoretically a desirable policy, such treat-
ment is contrary to the policy decision which has already been made
by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 5-114 was
deliberately chosen to provide protection for the customer. This comment
suggests that such a policy decision is correct.
Analysis of Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank
The litigation in Cromwell arose when European American Bank of
New York (EAB) attempted to draw drafts under letters of credit that
had been transferred 23 as security for a loan made to Combined In-
vestments, Ltd. (CI), a Louisiana partnership in commendam formed
on September 23, 1981 as a blind-pool real estate venture.2 4 Combined
Equities, Inc. (CE), a Baton Rouge-based tax-shelter promoter, served
as the general partner. Several Louisiana banks issued the letters of
credit at the direction of the investors in Combined Investments, each
of whom was required as part of the price for investing, to provide a
demand note secured by a letter of credit. Combined Investments de-
faulted on the EAB loan in September 1982. Beginning on November
21. See Harfield, Enjoining Letter of Credit Transactions, 95 Banking L.J. 596 (1978)
(an article taking a strong anti-injunction stand).
22. See 177 Misc. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634; Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy
Bank, No. 82-6413-H, Reasons for Judgment (15th La. Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 1983).
23. The trial court found that the letters of credit had been assigned to EAB.
Cromwell, No. 82-6413-14. The supreme court reversed that factual finding. Cromwell,
464 So. 2d at 736. For a discussion of the effect of that reversal, see infra text accom-
panying notes 108-23.
24. A blind-pool real estate offering is one in which no property is owned or
specifically designated as a potential investment at the time the units are sold. 464 So.
2d at 723.
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24, 1982, EAB drew drafts on the investors' letters of credit. The
investors' allegations of fraud led to the issuance of temporary restraining
orders which prevented the issuing banks from honoring EAB's drafts.2 5
The trial court granted a preliminary injunction based on its finding
that "there was substantial fraud in the underlying transaction by Com-
bined Equities, Inc." '2 6 The court, relying on Louisiana Civil Code article
1847,27 found that Combined Equities made oral and written misrepre-
sentations in connection with the transactions, including misrepresen-
tations concerning the investment objectives of Combined Investments. 28
In the trial court's view, the underlying transaction was Combined
Investment's sale of its limited partnership interests in consideration of
the letters of credit and the other payments from the investors.
The trial judge noted that the independence of the letter of credit
obligations from the defenses associated with the underlying transaction
was vital to the commercial utility of letters of credit. The trial court
opinion saw the tension between the commercial utility of the letters
and the "commercial expectation of honesty' 29 and concluded that the
"independence theory must not be allowed to protect a letter of credit
transaction that is based upon fraud." 30
The trial court perceived that EAB was a transferee of Combined
Investments, the beneficiary of the letters of credit.' Despite its rec-
ognition that letters of credit were non-negotiable, the lower court stated
that it would permit the independence principle to protect EAB if it
could prove that it took the letter of credit under circumstances which
would make it a holder in due course. 2 Based upon extensive testimony,
however, the court found that EAB was not entitled to be treated as
25. In addition to state court litigation on the letters of credit, EAB filed suit in
federal court to collect on the promissory notes. European American Bank v. Combined
Investments, Ltd., No. 83-0255-B (M.D. La. 1983).
26. Cromwell, No. 82-6413-H, minute entry (15th La. Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 1983).
27. "Fraud, as applied to contracts, is the cause of an error bearing on a material
part of the contract, created or continued by artifice, with design to obtain some unjust
advantages to the one party, or to cause an inconvenience or loss to the other." La.
Civ. Code art. 1847.
28. The trial judge found that the limited partners were led to believe that the
investment objectives of Combined Investments were to invest directly in real estate.
Instead, Combined Equities used the investors' capital contributions and loan proceeds
to lend money to its affiliates and to pay fees to itself, as general partner, and to other
affiliates. See Cromwell, No. 82-6413-H, Reasons for Judgment (15th La. Jud. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 10, 1983).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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a holder in due course because it was in bad faith and had notice of
the fraud practiced by Combined Equities on the investors.33
The third circuit did not disturb the factual findings of the lower
court, with one exception discussed below, but reversed the decision
based on the interpretation of "fraud in the transaction. 3 4 According
to the appellate court, the "independence of the letter of credit from
other contracts, arrangements and relationships involved in the underlying
transaction, out of which the letter of credit arises, is the cornerstone
of its utility."
35
The appellate court's decision was based largely upon its charac-
terization of the structure of the standby letter of credit transaction.
The court stated that in the standby letter of credit there were four
parties-the same parties who were found in the documentary letter of
credit plus a lending bank who loans money to the seller to finance
the underlying transaction. 36 Thus, the court found that the ordinarily
dual role of the seller-beneficiary was divided into two separate roles-
the seller and the lending bank-beneficiary.17 The court concluded that
EAB, the lending bank-beneficiary, was a fourth party not involved in
the fraud committed by Combined Equities.
The court did not reach the assignment issue because it seemed not
to understand that the letters of credit had originally been issued not
to EAB but to Combined Investments. The trial court found, and the
record adequately supports a finding, that Combined Investments, not
EAB, was a beneficiary of the letters of credit. The letters were assigned
or transferred to EAB,3 s but did not name it as the beneficiary. The
third circuit inexplicably chose to disregard the lower court's findings.
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that if EAB was guilty of fraud
with respect to the investors or knew of the fraud committed by CE
or CI that an injunction should issue.3 9 The supreme court found that
EAB was not guility of any fraud and had no notice of any fraud and
33. Id. The trial court found EAB in bad faith because of its knowledge of the
unstable financial condition of the general partner. The court also concluded that EAB
had knowledge of the written misrepresentations made by Combined Equities in the Private
Placement Memorandum.
34. Cromwell v. Commerce & Energy Bank, 450 So. 2d 1, 9 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1984).
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id. at 7.
37. Id.
38. Cromwell, No. 82-6413-H, Reasons for Judgment (15th La. Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb.
10, 1983). See infra at fn. 102-123 and text accompanying for a discussion of the assign-
ment of the letters of credit and whether an assignee-beneficiary should be subject to the
customer's defense of fraud in the underlying transaction.
39. 464 So. 2d at 734.
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therefore affirmed the third circuit's denial of a preliminary injunction.4
However, because the parties did not stipulate that the court's decision
on the preliminary injunction would preclude a trial on the merits the
case was remanded to the trial court for a trial on the permanent
injunction."
The supreme court characterized the letter of credit transaction
differently from both the trial court and third circuit. The court viewed
the transaction as including three parties: EAB, as the "final benefi-
ciary, '4 2 CI, and the issuing banks.43 The loan transaction between EAB
and CI was the underlying transation, i.e., the transaction that if fraud-
ulent would support an injunction. The transaction between the investors
and CI and CE was apparently regarded as a subsidiary transaction
which should be looked to in determining fraud in the underlying trans-
action .4
Fraud in the Transaction
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the third circuit's holding
that "fraud in the transaction ' ' 45 does not include fraud in the underlying
transaction.4 6 The decision is an important one, because there are rel-
atively few cases reaching such a result. This writer submits that this
result was correct in light of the legislative history of Section 5-114 and
the prior jurisprudence.
40. Id. at 736.
41. Id. at 737.
42. 464 So. 2d at 723.
43. Id. at 722.
44. The transaction could be diagramed as follows:
EAB (beneficiary
cI issuing banks
Investors
The relationship between the issuing banks and CI is unclear. The supreme
court apparently adopted the traditional view that a letter of credit involves
only three parties. Thus, the third circuit's characterization of the transaction
as involving four parties seems to be overruled. See discussion infra at 21. In
contrast to the preceding diagram, the third circuit would probably picture the
transaction as follows:
EAB CI
investors issuing banks
45. U.C.C. § 5-114.
46. Despite the court's failure to find fraud in the instant case, the statement that
fraud exists in the underlying transaction is not mere dicta. The trial court must grant
an injunction, if after trial on the merits, it finds EAB was a party to or had knowledge
of the fraud.
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Early Jurisprudence
The seminal decision involving fraud in the underlying transaction
is Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp.47 Sztejn contracted to
buy a shipment of bristles from an overseas merchant and furnished a
letter of credit as payment for the goods. The seller shipped cow hair
and other worthless rubbish instead and subsequently presented drafts
drawn under the letter of credit for payment. The court heard the case
on a motion to dismiss and thus accepted as true the plaintiff's allegations
that the seller "intentionally failed ' 48 to ship the correct merchandise
and that the "primary transaction was tainted with fraud." '49 The court
was concerned with preserving the commercial utility of letters of credit,
but denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating that "the principle
of the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of credit
should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller." 50 The Sztejn
court never used the words "underlying transaction" as being the source
of the fraud. However, the court's language indicates that the buyer-
seller transaction was the source of the fraud. Reference to the seller's
intentional failure to ship conforming merchandise and to the distincion
between active fraud and mere breach of warranty supports this view.,'
The third circuit cited Sztejn as supporting an injunction in cases
where "the beneficiary-seller committed active fraud rendering the doc-
uments fraudulent.""2 The supreme court opinion perpetuated this view.
The court discussed the holding in Sztejn and noted it had been applied
in Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apartments,3 a case involving
fraudulent documents. 4
Fraud in the transaction is often mislabeled as fraud in the docu-
ments.55 The theory for such an analysis is that documents which rep-
resent that conforming merchandise had been shipped, when in fact the
seller has fraudulently failed to do so, are themselves fraudulent.
5 6
Technically, only documents that were initially genuine and later altered
47. 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
48. Id. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
49. Id. at 723, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
50. Id. at 722, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
51. Id. at 722-23, 31 N.Y.S.2d at 634-35.
52. Cromwell, 450 So. 2d at I 1. For similar views of Sztejn, see also Harfield, supra
note 21, at 601-05; Note, Letters of Credit: Injunction As A Remedy For Fraud in U.C.C.
Section 5-114, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 487, 501 (1979).
53. 311 Minn. 452, 250 N.W.2d 172 (1977).
54. 464 So. 2d at 731.
55. Comment, supra note 16, at 1006-07. See B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-55 to 8-
57, for an analysis of cases decided on the basis of fraudulent documents, when actually
the fraud occurred in the transaction.
56. Comment, supra note 16, at 1007.
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can be considered fraudulent. 7 Thus, the real source of the fraud, and
therefore the correct focal point in Sztejn and similar cases, is the
underlying transaction.58 It is particulary important to recognize the true
source of the fraud when applying the reasoning in documentary letter
of credit cases to standby letter of credit cases, because in a standby
case there are few, if any, documents, and thus documentary fraud is
rare. Incorrectly reasoned documentary letter of credit cases fail to
provide the precedent for enjoining payment in the underlying transaction
in a standby letter of credit. Despite the above argument that Sztejn
stands only for the proposition that an injunction should issue due to
fraudulent documents, the vast majority of cases and commentaries
reviewing the decision have cited it as supporting an injunction due to
fraud in the underlying transaction.59
The Uniform Commercial Code-Early Drafts and Comments
The redactors of the Uniform Commercial Code intended to codify
the Sztejn holding in Section 5-114.60 The early drafts and comments
to the U.C.C. demonstrate that the drafters intended the phrase "fraud
in the transaction" to cover many circumstances. 6 For example, the
1950 American Law Institute draft of the Uniform Commercial Code
contained an early version of Section 5-114. Under that section62 an
issuing bank was excused from honoring a draft by "forgery or fraud
in any required document of title or to the insurance and was also
excused as against a seller or other consignor by non-conformity of the
goods so severe that it amounted to fraud. ' 63 The comments to that
section reiterate the principle set out in Sztejn: the beneficiary's good
faith is the key to the commercial utility of the credits. 64 The 1951 draft
of the U.C.C. incorporated Section 5-120 into Section 5-111, with only
minor changes in the language. Section 5-111 provided that an issuing
bank, unless enjoined, could honor a letter of credit "whether or not
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1007-08; B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-55 to 8-57.
59. See, e.g., J. White & R. Summers, supra note 2, at 736.
60. United Bank, 41 N.Y.2d at 259, 360 N.E.2d at 948, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
61. Id. at 260, 360 N.E.2d at 949, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
62. U.C.C. § 5-120 (Proposed Final Draft 1950).
63. Id.
64.
Essential good faith is again the key to the final provision of this section.
Where a non-conformity in the goods is such as to demonstrate fraud, the
general purpose of the institution must yield to proof, if it can be had, of the
beneficiary's bad faith in the particular case.
Id. § 5-120, comments.
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* . . notified of a forgery or fraud or an alleged forgery or fraud in a
document apparently regular on its face." '65
The language of Section 5-111 indicates that the drafters contem-
plated some type of fraud other than fraud in the documents. The
general phraseology of the statute, particularly given the language of
Section 5-120, its immediate predecessor, supports the conclusion that
the redactors intended any type of fraud in a letter of credit transaction
to support an injunction. If the drafters had intended to change the
portion of Section 5-120 that allowed an injunction for fraudulently
nonconforming goods, surely Section 5-111 would have been phrased more
restrictively. Section 5-111 was codified with no substantive change in
Section 5-114.66 As one commentator has noted:
[Tihe legislative history of section 5-114(2) indicates that "fraud
in the transaction" was meant to embody an exception to the
independence principle and provide for injunctive relief based
solely on the beneficiary's misperformance of the underlying
contract .
6
Subsequent Cases
Relatively few cases have arisen under Section 5-114(2)(b) since the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code nearly 30 years ago. Several
courts have granted injunctions based on fraud in the underlying trans-
action. Other cases have taken the contrary view-that fraud in the
underlying transaction will not support an injunction. Significantly, none
of the latter cases found fraud in the underlying transaction.
Courts have granted injunctions in nonconforming merchandise cases
similar to Sztejn. In United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp.,68 the seller sent used, torn, and mildewed boxing gloves instead
of the new gloves the customer had ordered. The court found that the
drafters of Section 5-114 intended the phrase "fraud in the transaction"
to be flexibly applied to the circumstances of the individual case. 69 The
court recognized the difficulty of drawing a line between a mere breach
of warranty and fraudulent practices on the part of the seller.70 However,
the court found that the plaintiff had proven that the defendant was
65. U.C.C. § 5-111 (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
Sept. 3, 1951).
66. U.C.C. § 5-114 (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Recommendations of the Editorial Bd. 1956).
67. Comment, supra note 16, at 1004 (footnote omitted).
68. 41 N.Y.2d 254, 360 N.E.2d 943, 392 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976).
69. Id. at 260, 360 N.E.2d at 949, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
70. Id. at 260-61, 360 N.E.2d at 949, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
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"guilty of fraud in shipping, not merely nonconforming merchandise,
but worthless fragments of boxing gloves." '7' Any ambiguities created
by the Sztejn opinion as to whether an injunction under Section 5-114
would issue only for fraudulent documents seems to have been resolved
in United Bank. The focus was on the fraud committed in the underlying
sales contract, rather than on fraudulent documents.
In NMC Enterprises, Inc. v. CBS,72 a wholesaler of audio equipment
contracted to buy four different models of stereo receivers from the
defendant, CBS. The receivers did not conform to the technical speci-
fications in the sales brochures. The plaintiff introduced evidence that
CBS was aware of the defects in the equipment and marketed them
anyway. The court noted that generally a letter of credit is independent
of the underlying sales contract but concluded that "where no innocent
third parties are involved and where the documents or the underlying
transaction are tainted with fraud, the draft need not be honered. ' '73
The focus of the court in NMC, as in United Bank, is clearly on the
fraud which existed in the underlying sales transaction.
In Banco Espanol de Credito v. State Street Bank & Trust Co.," 4
the seller's misrepresentation that certain samples had been inspected
resulted in the trial court's finding of fraud in the underlying transaction.
That finding was not challenged on appeal. However, the appellate court
found the plaintiff to be a holder in due course and thus, relying on
Section 5-114(2)(a), granted no injunction. 75 In prior litigation, the Ap-
pellate Court reversed the trial court's finding that the documents, in
this case an inspection certificate, were fraudulent.7 6 Thus, as in the
cases discussed above, the court's decision was based on fraud in the
underlying transaction, rather than on documentary fraud.
The courts have been equally willing to grant an injunction in standby
letter of credit transactions. Allegations of fraud in procuring letters of
credit and fraud in the performance of the underlying transaction were
sufficient to defeat a collecting bank's motion for an accelerated judg-
ment in Banco Tornquist v. American Bank & Trust Co.77 In that case,
the plaintiff-beneficiary was given a standby letter of credit to secure
payment of the debts of various Argentinian corporations. The court
did not elaborate on the basis for the allegations of fraud in procuring
the letter of credit, but did note charges of fraudulent depletion of the
71. Id. at 261, 360 N.E.2d at 949, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
72. 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
73. Id. at 1429.
74. 409 F.2d 711 (1st Cir. 1969).
75. Id. at 713-14.
76. Id. at 712.
77. 71 Misc. 2d 874, 337 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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assets of the debtor companies. The court, relying on Sztejn, denied
the plaintiff's motion for accelerated judgment.78
The Eight Circuit in Bank of Newport v. First National Bank79 held
that an issuing bank properly dishonored a draft drawn under a standby
letter of credit. The facts in that case were similar to those in Cromwell.
A group of doctors contracted to buy several blood pressure testing
machines. The doctors issued a letter of credit to the seller upon the
representation that it would only be used as security by the supplier
and would never be called. The seller, however, did not deliver the
equipment and contrary to the representations made to the doctors,
pledged the letter to its bank as security for a general loan. As in NMC,
the court held that fraud in the underlying transaction was an exception
to the independence principle. 0
Several cases have strongly emphasized the independence of the letter
of credit from the underlying transaction and seem to be contrary
authority for granting an injunction due to fraud in the underlying
transaction. However, none of those courts actually found fraud in the
underlying transaction. Thus, the courts' strong language, while perhaps
persuasive authority, should be viewed properly as dictum.
In Cappaert Enterprises v. Citizens & Southern International Bank,8s
a suit to enjoin payment of a credit based upon allegations of fraud
in the underlying transaction, a Louisiana federal district judge stated:
"It is axiomatic that C & S Bank's obligation under its letter of credit
is independent of, and therefore not affected by, the veracity of Cap-
paert's allegations of fraud by United Fisheries in the underlying joint
venture. "82 However, the court noted later that Cappaert had not made
a sufficient factual showing of fraud in the underlying transaction, and
the court's rejection of this "underlying fraud" theory is therefore only
dicta.3 The supreme court in Cromwell relied on Cappaert as strongly
supporting the independence principle, yet failed to note that the ref-
erences to the independence principle were dicta.14
78. Id. at 875, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
79. 687 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1982).
80. [W]here the draft itself and the underlying transaction are tainted with fraud
or actual knowledge that the underlying transaction is being wholly thwarted
by the beneficiary... , the draft need not be honored. Under the circumstances
here presented, the salutory commercial doctrine of the independence of the
letter of credit from the underlying transaction has no application.
Id. at 1261.
81. 486 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1980).
82. Id. at 826.
83. Id. at 829.
84. 464 So. 2d at 733.
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Similar language can be found in KMW International v. Chase
Manhattan Bank.,85 where payment of a letter of credit was not excused
by the United States' embargo of shipments to Iran. The court held
that the "unsettled situation in Iran"86 which made performance im-
possible, was insufficient to release the parties from their obligation.
As in Cappaert, there was no proof of fraud and thus the court's
discussion of the independence from the underlying transaction is dicta.
Even the court in O'Grady v. First Union National Bank,8 7 a case
frequently cited as upholding the independence principle and rejecting
the fraud in the underlying transaction principle, probably would have
enjoined had there been a sufficient showing of fraud in the transaction.
At issue in that case was whether the beneficiary's failure to obtain
additional collateral from other parties to the agreement constituted
fraud in the transaction. One letter of credit authority analyzed the
O'Grady decision as follows:
The court concluded that . . . the strong policy of Article 5 is
to keep separate the issuer's duty to honor drafts under the
letter from the underlying contract between beneficiary and cus-
tomer.
Nonetheless, the court concluded that an injunction would be proper
under Section 5-114(2)(b) if the documents presented were a "product
of fraud," citing the Sztejn case with approval. The court remanded
for a determination of whether the beneficiary bank was aware of a
condition imposed by O'Grady that the underlying notes be secured by
additional collateral. If the bank knew of this condition, the draft and
notice of default would be a "product of fraud" sufficient to justify
the injunction and cancel the letter. 8
As the analysis indicates, the O'Grady court seemed perfectly willing
to grant an injunction due to fraud. Though this writer disagrees with
the O'Grady court's reasoning, which seems to focus on fraudulent
documents rather than fraud in the transaction, the thrust of the opinion
is that fraud in the transaction would justify an injunction.
In light of the jurisprudence outlined above, this writer feels that
the supreme court in Cromwell could have written an opinion strongly
in favor of the fraud in the underlying transaction theory. Instead, the
court reluctantly acknowledges that an injunction may issue for non-
documentary fraud. The court began its analysis with Sztejn, recognizing
that that court "refused to allow a seller-beneficiary to profit from its
85. 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979).
86. Id. at 16.
87. 296 N.C: 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978).
88. B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-60 to 8-61.
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own fraudulent conduct.' ' 9 The court next analyzed Shaffer v. Brooklyn
Park Garden Apartments,90 a case involving fraudulent documents. The
court then discussed O'Grady, and found that it dealt with fraudulent
documents, rather than fraud in the transaction as the plaintiffs urged.
The court then reviewed Colorado National Bank of Denver v. Board
of County Commissioners.91 In that case a land developer issued a letter
of credit in favor of the county to secure the developer's promise to
build certain roads in a proposed subdivision. Though the development
was abandoned, the county attempted to collect on the letters of credit.
The issuing bank refused to honor the credits because the county's
recovery would constitute a windfall. The banks argued that such a
"windfall" recovery fell within the "fraud in the transaction" excep-
tion.92 The court emphasized the independence of the letters of credit
from the underlying transaction but later noted that fraud in the trans-
action between the county and developer had never been raised as an
issue.9 1
The Cromwell court next reviewed Cappaert which, like Colorado
National Bank, contained only dicta supporting the independence prin-
ciple.
The court summarized its analysis of the jurisprudence stating, "[als
illustrated in the foregoing cases the independence principle is a strong
influence in the decision of cases throughout the country. Adherence to
that basic principle is necessary in order to protect the commercial utility
of letters of credit." 94 At this point in the opinion the reader is left
with the impression that the court is going to adopt the position that
only fraudulent documents will support an injunction. The court con-
tinued, stating, "[n]evertheless, the jurisprudence and literature recognize
and illustrate the need to extend the meaning of 'fraud in the transaction'
at least a step beyond fraudulent documentation. The strongest reason
for such an extended interpretation is to deny rewarding fraudulent
conduct by letter of credit beneficiaries." 95 The court cited one treatise
in support of this position, but did not cite any cases, review the legislative
history, or distinguish any of the apparently contrary cases, O'Grady
and Cappaert for example.
In addition to the court's rather reluctant application of the fraud
in the underlying transaction theory, the court granted little deference
89. 464 So. 2d at 731
90. 311 Minn. 452, 250 N.W.2d 172 (1977).
91. 634 P.2d 32 (Colo. 1981).
92. Id. at 39.
93. Id. at 40.
94. 464 So. 2d at 733.
95. Id.
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to the trial court's substantial factual findings of fraud. 96 Thus, even
though the court has adopted the fraud in the underlying transaction
theory, the supreme court's restrictive interpretation of what constitutes
fraud will probably result in few injunctions.
On the other hand, Cromwell can be read more broadly. The court
did not require that EAB actively participated in the fraud. Rather, had
EAB made the loan to CI with knowledge of the fraud that had been
practiced upon the investors months earlier, it would have been unable
to collect on the credits. Another distinction between Cromwell and the
jurisprudence discussed above is that the latter, with the exception of
Banco Tornquist, involved fraudulent performance and not fraudulent
inducement in obtaining the letter of credit, as was apparently the case
in Cromwell. The court in Hohenberg Co., Inc. v. Comitex Knitters,
Ltd. ' 9 suggested that only fraudulent performance should be sufficient
to enjoin payment of the letter of credit. 98 The opinion does not explain
the reason for distinguishing between fraudulent performance and fraud-
ulent inducement in granting an injunction. A strict interpretation of
the independence principle would possibly support recognizing such a
distinction. Those who support the independence principle feel that since
the letter of credit is independent from the underlying transaction, only
fraudulent documents should support an injunction. Granting an in-
junction based on fraudulent documents does not, in their view, destroy
the independence principle because the documents are integral to the
actual letter of credit transaction-the transaction between the issuing
bank and the beneficiary. 99 The O'Grady court and others feel' ° that
any fraud in the performance of the underlying transaction is reflected
in the documents, causing them to be fraudulent. For example, under
their theory if fraudulently nonconforming merchandise is shipped, the
bill of lading showing a shipment of conforming merchandise is itself
96. Crowell, No. 82-6413-H, Reasons for Judgment (15th La. Dist. Ct. Feb. 10,
1983).
97. 104 Misc. 2d 232, 428 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
98. Id. at 234, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 158. The court relied upon Foreign Venture Ltd.
Partnership v. Chemical Bank, 59 A.D.2d 352, 399 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1977), as authority
for only allowing an injunction due to fraudulent performance and not fraud in the
inducement, though its reason for doing so is far from clear. The issue in Foreign Venture
was whether payment on a loan, made to the beneficiary of a standby letter and later
reclaimed by the customer's liquidator, should have been counted as payment for purposes
of the letter of credit. The court held that such a dispute did not constitute fraud in the
transaction. The dispute occurred after the credit had been issued. Thus, there was no
fraud, and even if there had been, it would have occurred after the inducement to issue
the letter.
99. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 5-22.
100. See B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-55 to 8-57.
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fraudulent.'"" In the case of fraud in the inducement, the fraud would
not be reflected in the documents. Conversely, the language of Section
5-114 does not support distinguishing between fraud in the performance
and fraud in the inducement. Section 5-114 allows an injunction for
fraudulent documents or fraud in the transaction. Recognizing the above-
mentioned distinction between fraud in the performance and fraud in
the inducement is particularly important in a standby letter of credit
because it involves few, if any, documents. To deny an injunction based
on fraud in the inducement would leave a standby letter of credit
customer with virtually no judicial protection. The purpose of the in-
junction provision is to prevent an unscrupulous beneficiary from de-
frauding his innocent customer. Denying injunctive relief to an innocent
customer who has been defrauded in a standby letter of credit transaction
seems contrary to this purpose.
Assignment of the Letters of Credit
The other issue raised by Cromwell is whether an assignee of the
beneficiary of the letter of credit should be subject to this remedy.
Under Louisiana law an assignee of a contract right steps into the shoes
of his assignor. The assignee acquires all of the rights, no more and
no less, that his transferor had.'0 2 Conversely, an assignee is subject to
all of the defenses that could be asserted against the transferor.0 3 For
example, in Smith v. Richland Compress & Warehouse Co.,' °4 the most
recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision on this point, the assignee of
a warehouse full of cotton sued the defendant who was engaged in the
cotton storing business. The court stated, "[aIll the defenses which were
available against these parties [the assignors of the cotton], were open
to [the] defendant in this case."'0 5 The law of assignment is the same
in common law states."06 The trial court found that there was an as-
signment of the letters of credit, but in an effort to protect EAB, treated
an assignee-beneficiary as a potential holder in due course. The third
101. Comment, supra note 16, at 1006-07.
102. See Young v. Cistac, 157 La. 771, 103 So. 100 (1925); Halbert v. Klauer Mfg.
Co., 181 So. 75 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938); Edwards v. Terminix, 292 So. 2d 851 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1974).
103. See, e.g., National Am. Bank v. Southcoast Contractors, 276 So. 2d 777 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1973).
104. 153 La. 820, 96 So. 668 (1923).
105. Id. at 821, 96 So. at 669.
106. (1) By an assignment the assignee acquires a right against the obligor only
to the extent that the obligor is under a duty to the assignor . . ..
(2) The right of an assignee is subject to any defense or claim of the obligor
which accrues before the obligor receives notification of the assignment, but
not to defenses or claims which accrue thereafter ....
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circuit, as noted earlier, mischaracterized the structure of the standby
transaction by finding that EAB was a fourth party, and not involved
in the fraud practiced by the seller, Combined Equities, on its customers.
The trial court's opinion indicates a contrary finding, which is also
supported by the record. The trial court found EAB to be an assignee
of Combined Investments, the original beneficiary.107
The supreme court characterized the letter of credit transaction in
a way which gave EAB the greatest possible protection. CI is named
as the beneficiary on the letter of credit. However, the transmittal letter
accompanying the credit provides that: " 'European American Bank &
Trust shall be deemed for all purposes to be the beneficiary of the
Letter of Credit.' "108 The court apparently viewed the language in the
transmittal letter as controlling and treated EAB as if it had been the
original beneficiary. Had the court treated EAB as a transferee-bene-
ficiary,' ° a more difficult issue would have been presented. The court
would have had to decide whether EAB could be prevented from col-
lecting under the credit not because of its own fraud, but because of
the fraudulent conduct of CI.
This writer submits that the supreme court purposely avoided this
difficult issue and chose to give EAB the greatest possible protection
by treating it as the original beneficiary. In this respect, the supreme
court, third circuit, and trial court opinions are similar. None of the
courts were willing to subject a third party lender in a standby letter
of credit to the defenses available against its transferor.' 0°
Had the court treated EAB as an assignee of the letter of credit,
this comment suggests that, based on letter of credit law .and Louisiana
assignment law, the payment of the credit should have been enjoined.
(3) Where the right of an assignor is subject to discharge or modification in
whole or in part by impracticability, public policy, non-occurence of a condition,
or present or prospective failure of performance by an obligee, the right of the
assignee is to that extent subject to discharge or modification even after the
obligor receives notification of the assignment.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 336 (1979).
107. Cromwell, No. 82-6413-H, Reasons for Judgment (15th La. Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb.
10, 1983).
108. 464 So. 2d at 737.
109. Some portions of the opinion indicate that the credits were transferred from CI
to EAB. The court referred to EAB as the "final beneficiary" indicating that some type
of transfer occurred. 464 So. 2d at 723. The court in its statement of the facts noted:
"This reissuance was accomplished by having new letters of credit issued in favor of
C.I., Ltd. and then transferring those letters of credit to EAB." Id. at 727.
110. In this respect the supreme.court opinion is similar to both the trial court's and
the third circuit's. The trial court treated EAB as a potential holder in due course, despite
the fact that a letter of credit is not a negotiable instrument. See discussion infra at 22.
The third circuit characterized EAB as an original party to the transaction.
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As an assignee of the credit itself, EAB would have had the right
to draw its own drafts under the credit. In such a situation, since the
drafts are drawn by the assignee himself, there can be no negotiation."'
Therefore, it would not have been possible for EAB to take the drafts
under circumstances which would make it a holder in due course." 2
Since there was no negotiation of the drafts, EAB could never be a
holder and since it never gave value, certainly could not have holder
in due course status under Section 5-114(2)(a), ' 3 which provides that an
issuing bank must pay a holder in due course of drafts despite allegations
of fraudulent documents or fraud in the transaction. Thus EAB, as a
holder of a non-negotiable letter of credit, could never qualify for the
holder in due course protection offered in Section 5-114(2)(a). The
appropriate inquiry, therefore, is what rights EAB should have had as
an assignee-beneficiary of a letter of credit to collect payment.
The Louisiana law of assignment, which applies to contract disputes
generally, should apply to the situation in Cromwell, unless the more
specialized law governing letters of credit supplements or restricts the
general law in any way. A review of the letter of credit provisions
contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:501 et seq. indicates that
there is no restriction on the assignment of letters of credit. Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:5-116 4 provides two methods by which a letter of
credit can be assigned: Section 5-116(1) allows an assignment of the
letter of credit itself and gives the assignee the right to draw drafts;
Section 5-116(2) allows an assignment of the proceeds of the letter,
similar to an assignment of accounts receivable. The comments to that
article indicate that the normal rules of assignment should apply to
assignments of a letter of credit. '5
Ill. A negotiation requires that an instrument be transferred and delivered. See La.
Com. Laws § 10:3-202(1). A negotiation is required in order for one to be a holder. See
La. Com. Laws § 10:3-202, Comment I.
112. La. Com. Laws § 10:3-302 requires that a holder in due course take the instrument
for value. EAB did not give value for the drafts, but gave value for the letters of credit
themselves.
113. See supra note 4.
114. (1) The right to draw under a credit can be transferred or assigned only
when the credit is expressly designated as transferable or assignable.
(2) Even though the credit specifically states that it is nontransferable or
nonassignable the beneficiary may before performance of the conditions of the
credit assign his right to proceeds. Such an assignment is an assignment of a
credit right under the Civil Code and is governed by the articles thereof.
(3) Except where the beneficiary has effectively assigned his right to draw or
his right to proceeds, nothing in this section limits his right to transfer or
negotiate drafts or demands drawn under the credit.
La. Com. Laws § 10:5-116.
115. Id. § 10:5-116, Comment 1.
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Although several cases have interpreted Section 5-116(2),' 6 there
have been no reported cases finding an assignment of the letter of credit
itself under Section 5-116(1). Cromwell is the first case in the country
whose facts fit squarely under paragraph 1. In order to provide an
accurate decision and to furnish guidance to other jurisdictions on this
point, the supreme court should have corrected the interpretive errors
made by both the trial and appellate courts and applied section 5-116(1),
the appropriate statute, to the case.
In addition to the lack of jurisprudential guidance under Section 5-
116(1), there is little doctrinal authority interpreting that statute. The
authority that does exist, however, supports subjecting an assignee-
beneficiary to the defenses assertable against its assignor. As mentioned
above, the statute clearly allows an assignment of the letter itself and
the comments direct the reader to general assignment law. The experts
who have considered the problem have also looked to general assignment
law in determining the rights of an assignee-beneficiary of a letter of
credit. An assessment of this problem made by a commentator nearly
40 years ago is still relevant today:
The word "assignable" has an altogether different meaning from
that of the word "negotiable," and the mere fact that a credit
has been validly assigned would not be sufficient to overcome
defenses or set-offs which would be good against the assignor
(seller-beneficiary). Possibly the fact that a credit contains words
of express assignability might be sufficient to raise an estoppel
in favor of an assignee, as against such defenses or set-offs,
but this would hardly seem to square with the rule of law that
defenses good against an assignor are good against his assignee.
If a court had before it a "straight" credit (by the terms of
which no one could become a holder in due course of drafts
drawn under it) it would seem that even if it contained express
words of assignability the assignee might be confronted with
defenses or set-offs which are good against the assignor. Even
in the case of a credit under which it is possible for third parties
to acquire rights superior to those of the beneficiary, i.e., a
"negotiation" credit, an assignee (even if the credit contained
express words of assignability) might not acquire such superior
116. For example, in Bank of Newport, 687 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1982), the court,
referring to an assignment of the proceeds under a letter of credit, stated that:
Bank of Newport, as assignee, stands in the shoes of Fiscal, and obviously
Fiscal had no right to draw on the letter of credit without making provision
for the delivery of the machines. Bank of Newport, as assignee, only had the
right to receive payment on drafts properly drawn by the beneficiary Fiscal.
687 F.2d at 1261. See also Shaffer v. Brooklyn Park Garden Apts., 311 Minn. 452, 250
N.W.2d 172 (1977).
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rights. Such rights are assured only to parties who take, not by
assignment of the credit, but by negotiation in good faith of
drafts drawn under it." 7
The importance of this excerpt is that a third party can insulate himself
from defenses by receiving drafts drawn under the letter of credit and
meeting the requirements of the holder in due course. If the third party
fails to take advantage of this protection by having drafts negotiated
to him, and instead takes an assignment of the letter of credit, he would
be relegated to the status of a mere assignee, subject to all claims and
defenses available to the customer against the original beneficiary. The
article also noted that such a rule should not destroy the commercial
utility of letters of credit, as the trial judge in Cromwell thought it
might, but rather it should enhance it."' The author explained that the
assignee could have opted for holder in due course status."19 Furthermore,
since few defenses can be asserted against a beneficiary in a letter of
credit transaction (viz., forgeries or fraudulent documents or fraud in
the transaction), the risk that the assignee will not collect is minimal.
The beneficiary, on the other hand, realizes a tremendous benefit by
being able to assign the letter and obtain the financing needed to produce
goods or otherwise perform his obligation to the customer. The customer
receives a corresponding benefit as the assignment enables him to get
the performance he desires at a favorable rate.120
The same principle should apply equally today in a standby letter
of credit situation, such as that in Cromwell. The general partner should
be able to assign the letter of credit just as he would assign stock
certificates, for example, in order to get the necessary financing for the
limited partnership.
A more recent commentator has also reviewed the subject of the
assignability of the letter of credit. Professor Barkley Clark has stated
that an assignee-beneficiary of a letter of credit should be subject to
all of the defenses of the original beneficiary.' 2' He discussed ways in
which an assignee of a letter of credit could insulate himself from
possible defenses.' 22 In Cromwell, for example, EAB could have requested
that it be given drafts drawn under the letter of credit by Combined
Equities. Based on the statute and the doctrinal writers who have ad-
117. McGowan, Assignability of Documentary Credits, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs.
666, 678 (1948).
118. Id. at 680.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-77 ("A transferee beneficiary would presumably be
subject to any defenses or setoffs which the issuer has against the assignor.").
122. B. Clark, supra note 7, at 8-33 (1984 Cumulative Supp. No. 2).
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dressed the issue, the correct resolution of the situation in Cromwell,
and in any situation involving an assignment of the letter itself, is to
subject the assignee to all defenses its assignor is answerable for. The
good faith or notice of the assignee is irrelevant. The pertinent inquiry
is into the transaction between the customer or investor and the ben-
eficiary. The trial judge's reliance on Louisiana Civil Code article 21,1
in an effort to give EAB the greatest possible protection, while perhaps
laudable, did violence to the theory of the specialized status of a holder
in due course. The impact of the trial court's analysis is that an assignee
(in Cromwell, a major New York bank that could have easily protected
itself intially) will be given a chance to improve its status after the fact.
A more onerous burden is imposed on the plaintiff-investor, who has
to prove a defense against the beneficiary and, additionally, bad faith
or notice on the part of the assignee.
Such a burden is not justified by the clear wording of the statute
or by the authority on the point.
Conclusion
Cromwell illustrates the competing principles of the commercial util-
ity of letters of credit and the commercial expectation of honesty and
fair dealing in the context of a standby letter of credit. In reconciling
these two principles, the statute provides, and jurisprudence has held that
the independence principle must yield to the strong policy against fraud-
either in the documents or in "the transaction."
A few courts and commentators have analyzed the exception to the
independence principle as encompassing only fraudulent documents. Such
an analysis treats fraudulent documents and fraud in the transaction as
referring to the same type of fraud. Fraud in the performance of the
underlying tranaction will not always result in fraud in the documents.
Furthermore, based on such an analysis, fraud in the inducement of
the underlying contract would never justify an injunction.
Limiting the availability of an injunction to fraudulent documents
is especially devastating to a standby letter of credit customer who has
few, if any, documents to protect him. The Cromwell holding that an
injunction should issue due to fraud in the underlying transaction offers
some protection to the standby customer. However, the supreme court's
characterization of EAB as the original beneficiary indicates that the
court will make every effort to allow a third party lender to collect on
123. "In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed
and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural
law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent." La. Civ. Code art. 21.
[Vol. 45
NOTES
the credit. Based on Cromwell it will be very difficult for a standby
customer to prove that the holder of the credit, usually a third party
lender, committed or knew of the fraud.
In this writer's opinion, the extra protection afforded EAB was not
warranted by the facts of the case. The trial court's factual findings
indicate that the credits were assigned to EAB. Had these factual findings
been followed, EAB should have been enjoined regardless of its com-
plicity in the fraud perpetrated by CI and CE. If the beneficiary assigns
his letter of credit, his transferee should step into the shoes of the
transferor. Such a rule is consistent with general contract law in Lou-
isiana and throughout the rest of the country. This rule is also consistent
with letter of credit law which specifically authorizes an assignment of
letters of credit. A transferee of a non-negotiable letter of credit should
not be given the specialized status of a holder in due course.
Letters of credit must be recognized for what they are-commercial
instruments subject to certain statutory exceptions. They should not be
treated as gold bullion.
Laura K. Austin
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